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REGULATION S-K, ITEM 402: THE NEW EXEcUTIE
COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE RULES
I.

INTRODUCTION

Executive compensation has recently become a controversial
issue.1 Critics of executive compensation packages have focused
on the "unwarranted disparity" between executive compensation and
corporate performance or employee wages,2 especially in light of
the economic effects of our current nationwide recession, including
layoffs of thousands of workers?
Largely in response to escalating executive compensation packages and the criticisms which accompanied them, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Commission") on October 15, 1992,
adopted major revisions to Item 402 of Regulation S-K,4 the item
governing disclosure of issues pertaining to executive compensa-

1. See generally Robert M. Rosenblatt, Firms Must Fully Report Officers' Pay, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at Ai ("The measures take effect against a backdrop of public
revulsion at excessive executive pay and complaints of entrenched corporate managemerit."); Linda Grant, Shareholders Balk at Shift in Executive Incentive Plans, L.A. TRIES,
April 12, 1992, at Di CPublic resentment over balloomng pay packages has spilled over
from its peak
Now critics are honing in on incentives
as the vehicles by
which paychecks spiral ever upward."); Linda Grant & Marilyn Yaquinto, Investors May
Get More Input on Executive Pay, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at Al ("A persistent recession marked by job losses and reduced pay for many employees has turned executive
pay
into a simmering political issue. Many shareholders question whether the high
pay is deserved, particularly for executives at companies that are performing poorly.-).
2. HARoLD S. BLOOMENTAL & SAMuEL WoLFF, EMERGING TRENDs IN SERIcuRTms
LAW § 8.07[l], at 8-29 (1992). See also Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and
Corporate Governance; An Academic Perspective, in 1 24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 647, 660-61 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B-792, 1992) ("over the 1980s executive compensation increased at roughly four
times the rate of factory workers' pay").
3. See Kathy M. Knstof, Just How Much Do Executives Make, Really?, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1992, at D4.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (1992).
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tion.5 The revisions are designed to increase the total amount of
information disclosed and to simplify the method of presentation in
order to facilitate shareholder understanding. According to the
Commission's Executive Summary, the rules were enacted to "improve shareholders' understanding of all forms of compensation
paid to senior executives and directors, the criteria used by the
board of directors in reaching compensation decisions, and the
degree of relationship between compensation and corporate performance
196 This is to be accomplished by fumishing sharehold-

5. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange Act
Release No. 31,327, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,056 (Oct. 16,
1992) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
The Commission received over 900 comment letters to the proposed rules, including
approximately 555 from individual and institutional investors, 245 from issuers and their
affiliates, and over 100 from members of the consulting, legal, accounting and acadenic
communities. Id. at 83,416. The Commission reports that the letters generally supported
reform of the existing executive compensation disclosure scheme. IM
6. Id. Throughout this comment, the reader should keep in mind some basic forms of
compensation and the means available for shareholders to attack the form or amount of
that compensation under basic corporation law.
The primary forms of remuneration may be charactenzed as follows:
(1) cash salary;
(2) cash bonus (usually connected to corporate earnings);
(3) plans providing for the issue of stock to executives in exchange for
their services or for a cash price less than market value;
(4) deferred compensation in which cash payments will be made after
the executive's peak earning years, usually with provisions for continued consulting designed to defer income tax-until the time of receipt of the momes;
(5) pension plans providing for payment after retirement;
(6) stock option programs under which an executive is given the right to
purchase the company's stock at a price less than the anticipated value upon
the exercise of that right;
(7) "phantom stock" plans in which the recipient does not have to actually purchase stock but is credited with a specified number of units equivalent
to shares of stock and receives cash equivalents to dividends and market value
increases; and
(8) various fringe benefits or "perquisites," including use of company
vehicles, vacations and hospitalization at corporate expense.
DETLmEv F. VAGTS, BAsIc CORPORArION LAW 339-40 (2d ed. 1979).

Compensation is generally regarded as the major tool for extracting quality performance from corporate employees. Thus, the compensation package is a central concern of
management. From the viewpoint of a disinterested board of directors, an ideal package
would: "(1) attract and hold desired employees as against competitive offers; (2) reward
most highly and obviously those employees whose performance most satisfied management; (3) build morale both competitive and cooperative; (4) avoid taxes as much as
possible; and (5) be as cheap for the corporation as possible." Id. at 32. However, since
boards are rarely totally disinterested and even "outside" boards cannot function in an
atmosphere of "bare-knuckled bargaining," it is no wonder that executive compensation is
high. Id.
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ers with a presentation which is more understandable regarding the
nature and extent of executive compensation; this is to be accomplished through the consolidation of the items to be disclosed into
a series of tables.
,7 In other words, the revisions intend to
increase shareholder comprehension by decreasing the amount of
narrative information to be disclosed and increasing the amount of
detailed numerical information to be presented in tabular form.
As outlined above, the revisions basically replace narrative
requirements with quantitative disclosure. They accomplish this by
dividing disclosure into four basic components.8 First, the specific
amounts of compensation awarded or paid to "Named Executives"9
over the past three years must be disclosed in a single table. 1°
Second, the rules require more detailed disclosure (also presented
in tabular form) of specific types of compensation awarded or paid
to the Named Executives in the last year." Third, they require an
entirely new report from the Board of Directors' Compensation
Committee stating its executive compensation policies generally and
specifically delineating the criteria upon which the Chief Executive
Investment professionals suggest the following for shareholders examiung the executive compensation disclosure items: 1) compare executive pay with shareholder return,
particularly noting "[r]ising executive compensation in the face of sagging stock market
performance"; 2) watch how executives are being paid, particularly noting whether compensation is linked to stock performance; 3) check the compensation committee's report to
ensure that the company's pay philosophy should coincide with how the executives are
compensated; 5) find out how much stock the executives and directors own to see whether they hold a significant stake in the company's performance; 6) beware of a change in
auditors in the mddle of a controversy; 7) watch for "related transactions"; 8) beware of
antitakeover provisions. Earl C. Gottschalk, Jr., Revolutionary Proxies: Read Them &
Reap, WALL ST. L, Jan. 29, 1993, at Cl, C21.
Although they must keep i nund the factors stated above, which are necessary for
acquirng and retaining quality management, shareholders do have remedies to prevent
outrageous compensation. For example, shareholders could vote out directors who authorize
outrageous compensation. Furthermore, they could initiate suit attacking the quantum of
compensation under concepts of basic corporation law, self-dealing and waste. VAGTS,
supra, at 336. However, shareholders cannot attack compensation levels if they do not
understand them. It is this problem wuch the Comrmission attempted to remedy through
these rules.
7. l
8. Jonathan E. Gottlieb & Diana R. de Brito, Disclosure of Executive Compensation:
An Analysis of the SEC's New Rules, INSIGHrS, Nov. 1992, at 3.
9. "Named Executive" is defied in Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K. See mfra notes
21-25 and accompanying text for an explanation of the term Named Executive and whom
it includes.
10. Gottlieb & de Brito, supra note 8, at 3. For a complete discussion of the Summary Compensation Table, see mnfra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
11. Gottlieb & de Brito, supra note 8 at 3. For a brief discussion of flus more detailed tabular disclosure, see mnfra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.

1178

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol 43:1175

Officer's ("CEO's") compensation was based.' Finally, the rules
require another totally new item of disclosure: a performance graph
representing the return to the issuer's shareholders as compared to
a broad market index and an industry index or group of peer issuers for the last five years.' 3
Clearly the revisions make Item 402 of Regulation S-K quite
comprehensive. However, as with many comprehensive rules, the
Commission has failed to foresee all possible contingencies, thereby
creating gaps in regulation for certain issuers. Compliance with the
rules is therefore complicated and uncertain: some issuers will be
left guessing in the preparation of their proxy materials. First, this
comment outlines the new rules and highlights some of those areas
which may be of confusion to issuers. Second, it asserts that while
the rules should accomplish the articulated goals of the Commission, they may also interact with other recent securities law developments to
substantively
affect executive
compensation
4
decisionmaking.' This is not to say the Commission did not foresee such a result. On the contrary, it is likely that the substantive
effect of increased shareholder participation was an intentional,
albeit not formally articulated, goal of the Commission. Regardless
of the Commission's intentions, however, corporations will now be
motivated to more closely monitor the processes of decisionmaking
and executive compensation decisions themselves due to the increased access of shareholders to information and the increased
likelihood of shareholder
participation, directly or indirectly, in
15
matters.
corporate

12. Gottlieb & de Brito, supra note 8, at 4. For a complete discussion of the Compensation Committee Report, see infra notes 55-86 and accompanying text.
13. Gottlieb & de Brito, supra note 8, at 5. For a complete discussion of the Performance Graph, see infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
14. These recent developments include efforts to actually limit certain types of executive compensation arrangements, such as golden parachute agreements, and efforts to allow
shareholders to have greater input in the decisionmaking of corporations, both generally
and specifically in the area of executive compensation. For a discussion of these developments and how they may relate to the executive compensation disclosure rules in affecting
executive compensation decisions, see mifra notes 101-127 and accompanying text.
15. See Emanuel D. Strauss, The Compensation Committee Report on Executive Compensation, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1992, at 16 ("Although the SEC does not have the authority to
require compaies to change the way compensation decisions are made, change is likely
to be a by-product of the new focus on compensation disclosure.").
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ITEM 402: THE NEW EXECUTrVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS

The new rules require "clear, concise and understandable disclosure of all plan and non-plan compensation awarded to, earned
by, or paid
by any person for all services rendered m all
capacities to the [issuer] and its subsidianes." 6 Thus, the rules
intend17 comprehensive disclosure of all compensation regardless of
form.

However,. in a major change from the previous rules under
Item 402 and the new rules as originally proposed, the new rules
eliminate the requirement that the issuer disclose the compensation
of all executives as a group. I" Rather, the new rules require disclosure of the compensation of the Named Executives. The term
Named Executives includes the CEO, regardless of the amount of
his or her compensation, and the four most highly paid executive
officers serving at the end of the most recent fiscal year whose
annual salary and bonus (cash and non-cash), including amounts
foregone, exceeded $100,000.19 This means that the compensation
of an executive who resigned during the fiscal year need not be
disclosed? On the other hand, if an individual is included in the
definition of Named Executive, then all compensation paid to the
executive during the year should be disclosed even if it pertains to
21
the executive's services to the issuer in some other capacity
However, as under the old rules, an issuer does not have to disclose an individual's compensation if it is not "appropriate" 22
Among the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of inclusion of an individual as a Named Executive are: "(a)
the distribution or accrual of an unusually large amount of cash
compensation
that is not part of a recurring arrangement and

16. Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(2) (emphasis added).
17. However, there are two major exceptions to blanket disclosure. First, issuers need
not disclose the value of group life, health, hospitalization, medical reimbursement or
relocation plans that do not discrmnate in favor of executives and that are generally
available to all salaried employees. d at Item 402(a)C7).
Second, issuers need not disclose compensation paid to a Named Executive through
a transaction disclosed m Item 404 of Regulation S-K.
18. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,420.
19. Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(3). The $100,000 threshold is an increase over the
former $60,000 threshold. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,420.
20. W. Alan Kailer, Prepanng the Executive Compensation Tables, INSIGIrs, Dec.
1992, at 17.
21. L
22. Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(3), Instruction 3.
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is unlikely to continue; and (b) the payment of
cash compensation relating to overseas assignments that may be attributed predominantly to such assignments."2 '
A. The Summary Compensation Table
The Summary Compensation Table (the "Table") is the cornerstone of the new disclosure system. It is designed to show both
annual and long-term compensation in a single comprehensive
overview 24 Specifically, the Table requires disclosure of the compensation of the Named Executives for each of the issuer's last
three fiscal years in a seven column tabular format.2' The Table
is intended to enable shareholders to understand the extent and
form of executive compensation, to identify trends in compensation
awards, and to compare the compensation of executives to executive compensation in other companies.2 6 Among the items to be
included are the dollar values of base salary and bonuses (cash and
non-cash) earned by the executive during each of the fiscal years
reported.27 Amounts deferred at the election of the executive,
whether pursuant to a 401(k) plan or otherwise, should also be
included. 2' However, any amounts foregone at the election of the
executive pursuant to a program of the issuer in which stock or
other forms of non-cash compensation may be received in lieu of
annual compensation need not be included in the salary column but
should be included in the appropriate column (i.e. restricted stock
awards or options) in the year in which it is received.29
This is a one area which may be of confusion to issuers. As
stated above, if the executive elects to forego compensation pursu-

23. kd
24. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,416.
25. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b). The columns include annual compensation, broken
down into Salary, Bonus and Other Annual Compensation columns, and long-term compensation, broken down into awards, which include Restricted Stock Awards and Option/SARs columns, and payouts, or an LTIP Payout column. Finally, the seventh colmnn
is an All Other Compensation column to include anything not captured by the other six
columns. Id
No deviation from the given format is permitted except to omit a column which is
inapplicable to a certain issuer. A.B.A., Subcomm. on Employee Benefits and Executive
Compensation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
76,404 (Dec. 11, 1992).
26. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,420.
27. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(A), (B).
28. Id. at Item 402(b)(2)(iii), Instruction 1.
29. Id at Item 402(b)(2), Instruction 3.
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ant to a program in which stock or other non-cash compensation
may be received in lieu of salary or bonus, the issuer need not
include the amount foregone in the salary or bonus columns, but
must include that amount in the appropriate column of the Summary Table or the long-term compensation table.30 However, if the
-executive receives stock or other non-cash compensation as salary
or bonus, rather than in lieu thereof at his election, the fair market
value of the compensation must be included in the salary or bonus
column. 3" Thus, if the issuer offers the option of receiving noncash compensation in lieu of salary or bonus, the amount need not
be included in the salary or bonus columns; if, on the other hand,
the issuer unilaterally pays the executive a portion of his salary or
bonus in stock or another form of non-cash compensation, the
amount must be reported in the salary or bonus column, as appropriate.
The dollar value of other annual compensation not properly
categorized as salary or bonus should also be included m a separate column, aptly entitled "Other Annual Compensation" This
includes perquisites and other personal benefits;33 above-market or
preferential earnings on restricted stock, options, stock appreciation
rights ("SARs") or deferred compensation paid or payable at the
election of the executive;' earnings on long-term incentive plan
("LTIP") compensation paid or payable at the election of the executive;3 5 payments to cover the executive's taxes, or "gross-

30. For a brief discussion of the long term compensation table, or Long-Term Incentive
Plan Awards Table, see infra note 51.
31. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2), Instruction 2.
32. Kailer, supra note 20, at 17. Kailer has suggested that the practical solution to this
problem may be to report restricted stock or options granted either at the executive's
election or as salary or bonus only under the appropriate column for restricted stock or
options and to report unrestricted stock awards received either at the executive's election
or as salary or bonus only in the salary or bonus column, as appropriate. Id.
33. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C)(1). To be reportable under this item the
aggregate value of perquisites and benefits must exceed a specified threshold. That
threshold amount is the lesser of $50,000 or 10% of the total salary and bonus reported
for the executive for the year. Id. Furthermore, particular perquisites valued at more than
25% of the sum of all perquisites must be described individually in a footnote. IL
34. L at Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C)(2). Earnings are -above-market" only if the rate of
interest paid is in excess of 120% of the applicable federal long-term rate ("AFR") in
effect at the time the rate was set. Id. at Item 402(b)(2)(iii), Instruction 3. AFR data is
published monthly by the Internal Revenue Service. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at
83,423 n.45. Moreover, dividends are reportable under this item only to the extent they
are preferential, i.e. they are earned at a more favorable rate than dividends on the
issuer's common stock. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(c), Instruction 4.
35. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C)(3).
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ups";36 and preferential discounts on stock purchases.3 7 The disclosure of LTIP compensation in the Other Annual Compensation
column raises another area of confusion under the Table. In order
to disclose LTIP payouts or awards under the appropriate column,
one must be able to recognize and identify an LTIP The confusion
in this area relates to the definition of "Long Term Incentive
Plan." 38 The term is defined so broadly as to include several possible plans which the Commission did not contemplate should be
disclosed as such. 39 Thus, as a practical solution, one commentator has suggested that only those plans under which the compensation to be paid is explicitly based on the issuer's performance
should be disclosed.'
The fourth, fifth and sixth columns of the Table encompass
long-term compensation: restricted stock awards, options and SARs,
and LTIP payouts, respectively In the restricted stock award colun, the reported dollar value of any award of restricted stock
should be reduced by the amount of consideration paid by the
executive.4 However, awards of restricted stock that are subject
to performance-based conditions on vesting, in addition to time
limitations and/or continued service with the issuer, may be reported as LTIP awards instead of restricted stock awards; if this approach is adopted, it must also be reported as an LTIP payout
upon vesting.42 If an award of restricted stock provides for vestIng of all or part of the shares within three years ftom the date of
the grant, then footnote disclosure is required regarding the terms
of vesting.43

36. Id at Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C)(4).
37. Id at Item 402(b)(2)(iii)(C)(5). If any amount is reportable under this section, the
issuer should disclose the dollar value of the difference between the pnce paid by an
executive for any security of the issuer and the fair market value of such security, unless
the discount is generally available to all security holders or to all salaried employees of
the issuer. Id
38. Kailer, supra note 20, at 17. "Long Term Incentive Plan" is defined in Regulation
S-K, Item 402(a)(6)(iii) as
any plan providing compensation intended to serve as incentive for performance
to occur over a period longer than one fiscal year, whether such performance is
measured by reference to financial performance of the registrant or affiliate, the
registrant's stock pnce, or any other measure, but excluding restricted stock,
stock option and SAR plans.
39. Kailer, supra note 20, at 17.
40. Id
41. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2)(iv)(A).
42. Id at Item 402(b)(2)(iv), Instruction 1.
43. Id at Instruction 2.
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In the option/SAR grant column, the SARs must include cashonly SARs as well as those payable in stock.' Furthermore, in
the LTIP payout column, the waiver of performance targets or
other conditions required for realization of the award if they
per45
footnote.
a
in
disclosed
be
must
payout
reportable
a
tam to
The final column is a catch-all column to report any compensation not already reported in the Table.' All compensation reported in the last fiscal year must be identified and quantified in a
footnote.47 Moreover, amounts paid under golden parachute or
similar agreements, triggered by a change in control event or an
executive's resignation or termination, are technically subject to
disclosure in this column. However, as a practical matter, such
amounts will not be disclosed because a severed executive will not
be serving at the end of the fiscal year and thus will not be a
Named Executive subject to disclosure under the rules.48
B.

More Detailed Tabular Disclosure

Five tables round out the tabular disclosure required by the
new rules. They are the Option/SAR Grant Table, 49 the Aggregated Option/SAR Exercise & Fiscal Year-End Option/SAR Value
Table, 50 the Long-Term Incentive Plan Awards Table,"1 the Pension Plan Table, 52 and the Option/SAR Repricing Table.53 These
44. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,425.
45. Regulation S-K, Item 402(b)(2)(iv), Instruction 4.
46. IM at Item 402(b)(2)(v).
47. Id
48. However, such arrangement will probably be described narratively in the issuer's
proxy materials in the years before the amount is paid; this narrative disclosure is required by Item 402(h). See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
49. Regulation S-K, Item 402(c). This table includes information concerning individual
grants of stock options, with or without tandem SARs, and freestanding SARs made to
Named Executives during the last fiscal year. Id at Item 402(c)(1).
50. Id at Item 402(d). This table includes information concernng the exercises of
stock options or tandem SARs, freestanding SARs by the Named Executives, information
concerning the value of the unexercised options and SARs held by the Named Executives
at the end of the fiscal year. Id at Item 402(d)(I).
51. Id at Item 402(e). This table includes information concermng each award made to
a Named .Executive during the fiscal year under any LTIP. Id at Item 402(e)(1).
52. Id at Item 402(f)(i). For any defined benefit or actuarial plan under which benefits are determined primarily by final compensation and years of service, this table requires information concerning estimated annual benefits payable upon retirement according
to a schedule of compensation ranging from $125,000 to $500,000 and years of service
ranging from 15 to 35. Id. at Item 402(f)(1)(i). In addition, this item requires disclosure
of the compensation covered by the plan as it relates to the Summary Compensation
Table, the estimated credited years of service for each Named Executive and a statement
as to the basis on which benefits are computed and whether they are subject to any off-
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tables will not be applicable to most issuers since they encompass
more sophisticated types of compensation. If a particular table is
inapplicable for an issuer, it may be omitted entirely 54
C.

The Compensation Committee Report and Other Narrative
Disclosures
1. The Compensation Committee Report

The most controversial of the new executive compensation
rules is the requirement that the issuer enclose in its proxy materials a report from the Compensation Committee (the "Committee")
of the Board of Directors (the "Report"). 55 The Report is intended
to "enhance shareholders' ability to assess how well directors are
representing their interests
,6 The proposing release stressed
this intention by stating that the Report's purpose was "to bring
shareholders into the compensation committee or board meeting
room and permit them to see and understand the specific decisions
made through the eyes of the directors."57
The Report accomplishes this by requiring disclosure of the
Committee's general compensation policies applicable to all officers, including an explanation of any relationship of these policies
to corporate performance.58 The Committee must also report its
basis for the CEO's compensation, including the factors and criteria
upon which the CEO's compensation -was based.5 9 A specific discussion of the relationship of the issuer's performance to the
CEO's compensation, describing each qualitative and quantitative

set amounts, including Social Security. i at Item 402(f)(1)(ii).
On the other hand, for any defined benefit or actuarial plan under which benefits are
not determned primarily by final compensation and years of service, this item requires a
narrative description of the formula by which benefits are determined and the estimated
annual benefits payable to the Named Executives upon retirement. Id at Item 402(f)(2).
53. Id at Item 402(i). The information in tlus table is reportable only if, during the
last fiscal year, the issuer, while a reporting company under § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a),
or § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d), of the Exchange Act, adjusted or amended the exercise
price of stock options or SARs previously awarded to a Named Executive. Id at Item
402(i)(1). Thus, inclusion of this table should be extremely rare.
54. Id at Item 402(a)(6).
55. See generally id at Item 402(k). If no committee performs the function of determining compensation, the Board itself should issue the Report. Id at Item 402(k)(3).
56. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,432.
57. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6940, Exchange Act
Release No. 30,851, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,003, at 82,868
(June 23, 1992) [hereinafter Proposing Release].
58. Regulation S-K, Item 402(k)(I).
59. I at Item 402(k)(2).
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measure of issuer performance upon which his or her compensation
was based, is also required.6" In meeting these criteria, boilerplate
language should be avoided, 6 but target levels or information
which would have an adverse effect on the issuer need not be disclosed.6 2
The Report's requirements provoked the strongest reaction
from commentators on both sides of the issue.63 The objections of
the corporate community may be summarized as follows: (1) the
Commission lacked authority, was interfering with the business
judgment rule,64 and was attempting to change the methods used
in making compensation decisions;65 (2) the provision requiring
the Report did not adequately recognize the oversight role of
boards of directors over compensation committees; (3) the specificity of disclosure was inappropriate, based, inter alia, on privacy
and competitive harm; (4) the disclosure requirement would have a
"chilling effect" on compensation committee members and would
make it difficult to get qualified persons to serve; (5) the Report
would create new grounds for legal liability, especially because of
the requirement that the Report be signed; and (6) issuers would be
forced to mcur the added expenses of outside consultants and increased legal fees.'
In response to comments the Commission received, it attempted to reach a compromise between the corporate community's concerns and maintenance of meaningful disclosure rules which would
elicit more than mere boilerplate responses.67 However, in defense
60. IM.
61. Id. at Item 402(k), Instruction 1.
62. Id at Instruction 2.
63. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,431. See also Strauss, supra note 14, at 16.
64. The business judgment rule springs from the fundamental principle that the business and affais of the corporation are managed by its Board of Directors. The rule itself
presumes that in making a business decision, the directors acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and with an honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
corporation. See AMEMCAN LAW INSTITE, PRiMCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §
4.01 (Proposed Final Draft, Mar. 31, 1992); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985). Thus, an individual challenging a board decision must rebut the
aforementioned presumptions. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. Critics of the Report obviously felt that, contrary to the business judgment rule, the Report would .create liability
and accountability for those matters which are in the Board's sole discretion.
65. It is the thesis of this comment that, despite the concessions the Coinussion made
in response to comments from the corporate community, this was precisely what it was
attempting to do. See infra notes 127-144 and accompanying text.
66. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,431-32. See also Strauss, supra note 14, at
16.
67. Strauss, supra note 14, at 16.
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of the new rules it promulgated, the Commission stated that the
Report would neither impose new fiduciary duties on directors nor
require any specific actions. 68 Furthermore, the Commission asserted that the Report was not inconsistent with business judgment
standards, which, in essence, ensure reasonable and good faith
action by the directors.69 Moreover, the Report does not require
an outline of the Committee's discussions or each Committee
member's reasons or motivations for supporting the Committee's
recommendations; a description of the Committee's rationale and
its relationship to performance are all that is required.7'
First, m response to specificity concerns, Item 402(k) now
only requires specific information about the CEO rather than all
Named Executives. 71 Only a discussion of the Committee's general policies with respect to the other Named Executives is required.72 This avoids potentially repetitive descriptions. 3 Furthermore, factors or criteria involving confidential information, mcludmg specific target levels for quantitative and qualitative performance factors, need not be disclosed if doing so would have an
adverse effect on the issuer.74 Finally, subjective personal performance factors relating to an executive's performance, such as personality and judgment, do not need to be disclosed. 75 In other
words, the 'mandated disclosure is solely based on corporate performance criteria, such as profitability, sales growth, return on
equity, and market share, upon which the Committee relied when
setting the CEO's compensation.76
Second, in response to concerns regarding potential liability to
Committee members which could arise from the Report, the Commission explicitly stated that the Report will not be subject to

68. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,432.
69. kd
70. Id.
71. Regulation S-K, Item 402(k)(2). See also Adopting Release, supra note 5, at
83,432.
72. Regulation S-K, Item 402(k)(1). See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
73. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,417.
74. Regulation S-K, Item 402(k), Instruction 2. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
75. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,417.
76. Id On the other hand, several practicing attorneys have expressed concern that
smaller businesses subject to the proxy rules may not rely on factors such as these. If a
Committee did not rely on such factors, it should certainly disclose the true basis for its
decision, regardless of its nature, in order to avoid future inconsistencies, whether in the
disclosure or litigative context.
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liability under Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of
19347

(the "Exchange Act")? 8 It averts liability by deeming the

Report not "filed" with the Commission and not "soliciting material" within the context of that section.7 ' Furthermore, the Report
will not be subject to Regulations 14A or 14C.80 The Commission
stated that the appropriate remedy for a shareholder who is dissatisfied with the Report is to remove the director from office - not
to initiate a lawsuit.8" In addition, the Report must be included in
an issuer's proxy materials only as they pertain to a meeting at
which directors will be elected. 2 As noted above, the Report is
not filed with the Commission in any other filings under either the
Exchange Act or the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act").
Finally, in response to the practical problems of obtaining the
directors' signatures as well as the concerns about personal liability, the Report need not be signed by the members of the Committee, as- originally proposed. 3
In addition, Item 402(k) now recognizes the oversight role of
the board of directors." If the board modified or rejected any
action or recommendation of the Committee, the Report must be
issued "over" the names of the entire board of directors. 85 The
relevant modification or rejection with the reasons therefor must
also be disclosed.8 6

77. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988). Section 18 explicitly grants a private right of action for
deceptive statements. Id
78. Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(9). Along with the exemption from Regulations 14A
and 14C, discussed infra at note 79, tis is the same treatment accorded to annual reports
under Rule 14a-3(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1992).
79. Id
80. It Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1992), governs the solicitation of proxies, including the information required to be contained in the proxy statement. Regulation
14C, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c (1992), governs the distribution of information statements to
shareholders when proxies are not solicited.
81. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,417.
82. Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(8).
83. The Report will, however, be issued -over" the names of each individual who
contributed to the compensation decisionmaing. Id at Item 402(k)(3). In other words, the
name of each Committee member, including any past member who participated m determining executive compensation, should appear at the end of the Report.
84. Strauss, supra note 14, at 12.
85. Regulation S-K, Item 402(k)(3).
86. Id

1188
2.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1175

Employment Contracts, Termination of Employment and
Change-in-Control Arrangements

Furthermore, issuers must describe in narrative form the terms
and conditions of any employment contract with a Named Executive and any compensatory plan for amounts in excess of $100,000
resulting from the resignation, retirement, or termination of an
executive officer, any change in control of the Issuer, or any
change in the executive's responsibilities. 7 The purpose of retainmg the narrative disclosure is the "clear interest" of the shareholders "in knowing what contractual commitments the board has made
on behalf of the [issuer], both with respect to present induce,,M8
and future promises
ments
3. Director Compensation
Finally, in addition to the voluminous information which must
be provided about the Named Executives, the issuer must include a
narrative description of directors' compensation. 9 This basically
consists of a statement regarding the standard arrangements by
which directors are compensated for their services qua directors,
including specific amounts and disclosure of any additional
amounts payable for committee participation or special assignments. 9° Furthermore, it requires narrative disclosure of any other
non-standard arrangements, such as consulting agreements, by
which any directors were compensated for their services.9 ' This is
not a change from the former rules under Item 402.9
D.

The Performance Graph

The new disclosure rules require a line graph comparing cumulative total issuer shareholder return with general indicators of
shareholder return in the issuer's market and industry for at least
five years (the "Graph").93 The implication of this requirement is

87. M4 at Item 402(h).
88. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,431. Another likely reason for retaining tins
narrative disclosure is that otherwise, such severance payments might never be reported to
the shareholders. After an executive's termination, he or she is no longer a Named Executive and, therefore, his compensation is no longer subject to tabular disclosure. See supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
89. Regulation S-K, Item 402(g).
90. Id at Item 402(g)(I).
91. Id at 402(g)(2).
92. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,431.
93. Regulation S-K, Item 402(1)(1)(i), (1)(ii) and (2).
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that executive compensation should be justified by the comparative
market performance of an issuer's securities.' As the market index, the issuer should use the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite
Stock Price Index, if it is included in that index; otherwise it may
use Standard & Poor's or any broad equity market index which
includes companies traded in the same market or are of similar
market capitalization.95 An issuer may use a published industry index, peer issuers, or issuers with similar market capitalization as an
industry indicator.' In a correcting release issued on November 9,
1992, the Commission added the requirement that an issuer that
constructs its own peer issuer comparison must disclose the identity
of each issuer in its comparison group and weigh the returns of
each issuer for market capitalization.97
Since the purpose of the Graph is to aid shareholders in evaluating the decisions of directors in the context of re-election, 98 the
Commission provided exemptions from liability for selection of the
industry or peer index by exempting liability under Section 18 and
Regulations 14A and 14C of the Exchange Act.99 These exemptions are also intended to ensure that the issuer will not be subjected to liability concerning its selection of the indices for inclusion
in the Graph since no industry or peer index will be perfectly
comparable to a specific issuer.'00
One serious Issue concerning the Graph which the Commission has left unaddressed is how an issuer which has no public
market for its shares should design an appropriate index, especially
when fourth quarter information for its peer group is not publicly
available until after the issuer sends its proxy materials to the
shareholders. This question remains unresolved. However, at this
point, the sensible approach would be to provide as close an index

94. James H. Cheek, Ell, Shaping the Governance of Executive Compensation, in I
24TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 617, 639 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-792, 1992).
95. Regulation S-K, Item 402(0)(i)(i).
96. let at Item 402(f)(1)(ii).
97. Id at Item 4020), Instruction 5. Executive Compensation Disclosure; Correction,
Securities Act Release No. 6966, Exchange Act Release No. 31,420, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,061, at 83,499 (Nov. 9, 1992). See also American
Soc'y of Corporate Secretanes, SEC No-Action Letter, SEC No Action LEXIS 41 (Jan. 6,
1993).
98. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 83,417.
99. Regulation S-K, Item 402(a)(9). This is the same exemption from liability provided
for the Compensation Committee Report. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
100. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 84,417.
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as possible with a footnote disclaiming it. Issuers in this predicament should also be aware that a peer index may be comprised of
a single issuer and that financial consulting firms are starting to
address this problem for their clients and will soon begin compiling their own indices.
III.

OTHER RECENT

SEC INTATIVES AFFECTING EXECUTrVE

COMPENSATION: EFFORTS TO INCREASE SHAREHOLDER

PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE CONTEXT

Basically, the proposals affecting executive compensation have
taken two forms - those which have attempted to limit executive
compensation directly"' and those which have attempted to increase shareholder participation in the corporate context.' 2 The

101. Section 18(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(k)
,(West Supp. 1993), gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") authority to
promulgate regulations prohibiting or limiting golden parachute or indemnification payments. Id. § 1828(k)(1). The section defines a golden parachute as any payment or agreement to make a compensatory payment for the benefit of an affiliate pursuant to an obligation that is contingent on the recipient's affiliation, or is received upon the institution's
insolvency, conservatorslup or troubled condition. Ie § 1828(k)(4). As yet, the FDIC has
not issued its regulations.
102.
For example, the Corporate Pay Responsibility Act, 1991 H.R. 2522, 1991 S.
1198, (the "Act") was introduced in Congress to achieve more thorough disclosure of
executive compensation and give shareholders greater nghts to challenge it. BLOOMENTHAL
& WOLFF, supra note 2, § 10.04[4] at 10-64. The Act first provided that compensation
was an appropnate subject for action by a corporation's security holders. This would have
been achieved by a requirement that if a shareholder proposal met specified standards, it
would not be permitted to be excluded from an issuer's proxy materials. S. 1198 § 2
("recommendations, proposals, or statements on the policies, critena or methods to be used
in determinng or providing the compensation to be paid to the directors or chief executive officer of an issuer shall be considered proper subjects for action by its security
holders"). The need for this provision *has been mitigated by the Commssion's no-action
position detailed mfra at notes 123-27 and accompanying text. In addition, the Act required that proxy statements contain clear and comprehensive information regarding the
pay of directors and semor executives, including a single dollar figure representing total
compensation for the preceding year, a graphic representation of the total compensation received for the three preceding fiscal years, and the estimated present value, as defined by
the Commission, of any future, deferred or contingent compensation. Id Clearly, the need
for tis provision was also eliminated, given the new Item 402 disclosure rules.
Secondly, the Act provided for increased ability to nomnate directors and inclusion
of information concerning those nominations in the issuer's proxy matenals. Id Finally,
the Act provided for access to record ownership lists and the promulgation of regulations
protecting the confidentiality of the voting process. Id. § 3. These issues were addressed
by the Commission in the new proxy rules discussed mnfra at notes 103-22 and accompanying text. Given the suilarity of these provisions to the regulations promulgated by the
Commission under the Exchange Act and the no-action position taken by the Commission
in February, 1992, the proposed Act was put on hold and presumably will be tabled en-
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latter efforts obviously assume that increasing a shareholder's
awareness and participation in the corporate process will have the
secondary effect of limiting executive compensation, or at least
effectively monitoring it, making outright compensation controls
unnecessary
A.

Generally

Major changes in the area of proxy solicitations were proposed
and enacted together with the executive compensation rules, signalling their importance to the general scheme of empowering shareholders to affect directors' decisions pertaining to executive compensation, as well as other areas. In fact, the Commission explicitly
stated that Congress intended the role of the proxy rules in the
overall scheme of corporate governance to be assurance of "fair,
and effective shareholder suffrage." 3
In a nutshell, the new proxy rules
eliminate unnecessary regulatory obstacles to the exchange
of views and opinions by shareholders and others concerning management performance and initiatives presented for a
vote of shareholders. The [new rules] also lower the regulatory costs of conducting a regulated solicitation by management, shareholders and others by minimizing regulatory
costs related to the dissemination of soliciting materials.
The rules also remove unnecessary limitations on
shareholders' use of their voting rights, and improve disclosure to shareholders in the context of a solicitation as well
as in the reporting of voting results."°4
Specifically, the new rules amend the proxy rules promulgated
under Section 14(a)105 of the Exchange Act. In particular, Rule
14a-2(b)' ° was amended to create an exemption from the proxy
statement delivery and disclosure requirements for communications
with shareholders under circumstances where the communicator is
not seeking proxy authorization and does not have a substantial
interest in the subject matter of the vote or is otherwise eligible for

tirely.
103. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No.
31,326, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,051, at 83,355 (Oct. 16,
1992) [hereinafter Shareholder Communications Release].
104. Id. at 83,353.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (1992).
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an exemption."17 In addition, the definition of "solicitation" in
Rule 14a-1 108 was amended to specify that a shareholder can
publicly announce how he intends to vote and provide reasons for
that decision without requiring complicated compliance with the
proxy rules.' 9 Moreover, Rule 14a-3"10 was amended to add a
new paragraph (f), exempting solicitations conveyed by public
broadcast, speech, or publication from the proxy requirements,
provided a definitive proxy statement is on file with the Commission."' Rules 14a-3(a) and 14a-41 2 were amended to allow
issuers and other solicitors to commence a solicitation on the basis
of a preliminary proxy statement filed with the Commission so
long as no actual proxy card is distributed to shareholders until the
dissemination of a definitive proxy 113 Furthermore, Rule 14a7114 was amended to require issuers to furnish requesting shareholders copies of lists of shareholder names and position listings
under certain conditions and, in all other circumstances, to make an
election to either provide a list to the requesting shareholders or
mail the materials for them." 5 Rule 14a-7, in conjunction with
Rule 14a-4, also now requires that the actual proxy set forth each
matter to be voted on separately to allow shareholders to vote
individually for each matter, rather than voting for a package of
resolutions or a slate of candidates. 116 Finally, Items 4(c) of
Forms 10-K, 17 10-Q," 8 10-KSB" 9 and 10-QSB 120 and Item
21 of Schedule 14A12 1 were revised to improve disclosure of vot107. Shareholder Communcations Release, supra note 103, at 83,353.
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(0) (1992).
109. Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 103, at 83,353.
110. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(f) (1992).
111. Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 103, at 83,353-54.
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1992).
113. Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 103, at 83,354.
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1992).
115. Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 103, at 83,354.
116. Id
117. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1992). The Form 10-K is the form on which the annual
report is required to be filed pursuant to § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, or § 15(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d), of the Exchange Act.
118. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (1992). The Form iO-Q.is the form on which quarterly reports are required to be filed pursuant to §§ 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.310b (1992). The Form 10-KSB is the form on which "small
business issuers" should file their annual reports pursuant to §§ 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.308b (1992). The Form 10-QSB is the form on which "small
business issuers" should file their quarterly reports pursuant to §§ 13 or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I01 (1992). Schedule 14A contains the information required to
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ing results and of the vote needed for approval of matters presented to shareholders. 1"
B. Specifically in Relation to Executive Compensation
Specifically in the arena of executive compensation
decisionmaking, the Commission has facilitated shareholder participation through a series of no-action letters issued February 13,
1992.1" In a radical departure from its traditional position, the
Commission announced that proposals which suggest changes regarding executive compensation would henceforth be required to be
included in a corporation's proxy materials. 124 Historically, such
proposals had been excluded from the proxy statement based on

be contained in the proxy statement.
122. Shareholder Communications Release, supra note 103, at 83,354.
123. Aetna Life and Casualty, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,104 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing outside director's compensation
be reduced by $1,000 for each regular meeting he failed to attend); Baltimore Gas &
Electric, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,101 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing that executive compensation be capped at 20 times the
pay of the average employee); Battle Mountain Gold Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,107 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing compensatory stock options for executives be suspended until the corporation became more profitable); Bell Atlantic Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 76,110 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing that the corporation's short-term mcentive plan should be abolished); Black Hills Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,102 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing the retirement
plan for outside directors be abolished); Chrysler Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,103 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing the corporation institute a policy requiring a non-adjustable price for future stock options of executives); Eastman Kodak Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 76,109 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing disclosure of severance pay of executives); Equimark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 76,108 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing jpreclusion of termination compensation
to executives if the rate of return for common stock in the past three years was less than
eight percent); Grumann Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCM)
76,105 (Feb. 13, 1992) (proposing freeze of bonuses for executives
until dividends exceed a specified level); International Business Machines Corp., SEC NoAction Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,106 (Feb. 13,
1992) (proposing disclosure of officer compensation and supporting information).
All of the foregoing were deemed by the Commission to be non-excludible from the
corporations' proxy statements with two caveats: some of the proposals required revision
to be phrased as a recommendation or request, and some required clarification that they
related only to semor executive officers' compensation.
See also Reebok Int'l Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,131 (Mar. 16, 1992) (requinng inclusion of proposal requesting
Board to establish a compensation committee).
124. See supra note 123.
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Rule 14a-8(c)(7),' 5 promulgated under the Exchange Act, which
states that proposals relating to the conduct of the ordinary business of the corporation are excludible from the proxy statement
based on the directors' plenary power over the ordinary business
and affairs of the corporation." 6 The Commission explained the
change by noting that increasing public and shareholder concern
over executive compensation signified the importance of the issue. 127
C.

The Total Impact on Executive Compensation Decisionmaking

In addition to the articulated goals of the Commission in enacting the new rules, the Commission may have had other intended
objectives. It is likely the Commission was acting to motivate
shareholders to take a more active role in compensation
decisionmaking regarding the nature of compensation itself.
For example, in introducing the new executive compensation
disclosure rules, then Chairman Richard Breeden cited the "increasing and quite disturbing trend" of corporations awarding
"mega grants" to executives. 128 He noted that "aside from their
absolute size, some mega-options make mini-sense for shareholders.', 1 29 These comments would be irrelevant if the disclosure
rules were not meant to affect the underlying trends in executive
compensation itself. Chairman Breeden is also reported as stating
that the rules will "inform and empower" shareholders. 3 ' He reportedly stated, "The best protection against abuses in executive
compensation is a simple weapon - the cleansing power of sunlight
and the power of an informed shareholder base
The new
compensation disclosure rules will do away with impenetrable
legalistic narratives that often obscure the bottom line."' 3' Once
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1992).
126. Rule 14a-8(c)(7) ("The [issuer] may omit a proposal and any statement in support
thereof from its proxy statement
[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating to
the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the [issuer.]").
127. Reebok Int'l, SEC No-Action Letter, at 76,131 C'In view of the widespread public
debate concerning executive and director compensation policies and practices, and the increasing recognition that these issues raise significant policy issues, it is the
[Comnussion's] view that proposals relating to senior executive compensation no longer
can be considered matters relating to
ordinary business.").
128. Gottlieb & de Brito, supra note 8, at 3 (citing Opening Statement of Chairman
Richard C. Breeden at the Open Meeting of the Commission, October 15, 1992, at 5
[hereinafter Opening Statement]).
129. Id. (citing Opening Statement, at 6).
130. Id
131. Barbara A. Rehm, SEC Votes to Increase Shareholder Power, AM. BANKER, Oct.
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again, this signifies the Commission's belief that the disclosure
rules will sufficiently inform shareholders about executive compensation abuses and that once they are fully informed, shareholders
will have the power to curb those abuses and actually affect the
substance of compensation packages.
Specifically, one commentator, relying on statements by the
Commission, has stated that the Performance Graph
is intended not simply as a disclosure tool but as a means
to foster accountability by directors to shareholders "to be
used by shareholders in evaluating the quality of decisions
" The Permade by directors standing for re-election
formance Graph is intended to "complement the discussion
by the compensation committee
of the relationship of
executive compensation to corporate performance in a given
year." The effect of disclosure of the graph may be to
prompt shareholders to demand a closer relationship becompensation and a company's perfortween executive
13 2
mance.
The same can be said for the Compensation Committee Report as
well. In addition, the new proxy rules,13 adopted the same day
as the executive compensation disclosure rules, also act to empower
shareholders. In explaining the rationale behind the new proxy
rules, Chairman Breeden is reported as stating that it had become
"overwhelmingly clear" to the Commission that the proxy system
had acted to "insulate" management from accountability to shareholders.' 34
Thus, all these signals mandate the conclusion that the Commission clearly intended that together, the executive compensation
and proxy rules would have the secondary effect of limiting executive compensation. Nonetheless, the Commission rejected suggestions that it regulate executive compensation directly 135 Chairman
Breeden stated that it is the province of shareholders - not the
government - to monitor the decisions of the directors with re-

16, 1992, at 2.
132. Gottlieb & de Brito, supra note 8, at 5-6 (citing Proposing Release).
133. See supra notes 103-122 and accompanying text.
134. SEC Adopts Proxy Reform Package That Includes Executive Pay Disclosure Rules,
BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Oct. 16, 1992, at 201.

135. Id (citing Testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Subcommittee on Taxation of the Senate Committee on
Finance, June 4, 1992).
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36

The power shareholders will potentially receive as the result of
the new rules has understandably pleased representatives of shareholder groups; 137 likewise, several corporate representatives are
upset about the new rules because they believe the rules are costly,
complicated and open the door to corporate raiders, leaving corporations virtually defenseless. 38 Yet, at least one commentator be1 39
lieves the new rules make sense from a business perspective.
John Balkcom, a principal of a Chicago management consulting
firm, has stated that the new rules give boards of directors and
compensation committees the opportunity to clearly state executive
compensation packages." 4 This is beneficial because compensation committees have historically been "hobbled by platitudes
that
pass for compensation philosophies
[and] slowed or
confused by ambiguous responsibilities for top management pay
decisions and conflicted by turf wars among the chief executives,
the compensation committee and the full board of directors."1 4'
Thus, now many companies will have the opportunity to, indeed
will be required to, "do some fundamental rethinking about how
and why they make pay decisions."' 42
Furthermore, the Compensation Committee Report should serve
to define the roles of the Committee, the Board of Directors as a
whole, and the CEO. 43 Balkcom notes that few compensation
committees clearly understand their roles in decisionmakmg versus
the roles of the board and the CEO. 44 He states that "[w]ithout
clearly delineated powers regarding initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring of compensation programs, companies
risk awkward, adversarial proceedings" among the key players over
decisionmaking powers; thus, "clarifying these roles is one important aspect of the disclosure of 'the company's compensation poli-

136. Id.(citing Opening Statement, at 6).
137. SEC Adopts Proxy Reform Package After Long Study, Intense Debate, PENSION
REPORTER, Oct. 19, 1992, at 1799 (describing the positive reaction of United Shareholders
Association, a non-profit shareholder rights organization).
138. Id (describing the Business Roundtable's reaction to the shareholder commurcation
rules).
139. John E. Balkcom, Coming Clean on Compensation, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1992, §
3, at 11.
140. Id.
141. Id
142. Id.
143. Id
144. Id
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cies for executive officers'" 145
Despite Balkcom's positive exhortations regarding the new
rules, the rules simply do not inure to the benefit of corporate
issuers - nor were they intended to. The rules benefit shareholders
who would like to have a more active role in the governance of
the corporations in which they have invested. Until now, those
shareholders were disenfranchised and disempowered by a relative
lack of knowledge, whether it resulted from nondisclosure altogether or from the complexity of that disclosure. The new streamlined
disclosure system will remedy that problem. And this, in conjunction with the new proxy rules and the reinterpretation of ordinary
business matters under Rule 14a-8, will give shareholders the power to have input in the management of the corporations which they
own. To that extent, the rules are not unbeneficial to corporations
themselves. The corporations will have the benefit of interested
input and may be forced to operate more efficiently Thus, the real
losers under the new system of disclosure are the executives who
may be forced to take pay cuts and will have to pay closer attention to the needs and expectations of the shareholders whom they
represent.
HALLE FINE TERRION

145. I

